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Introduction: 
 
Technological changes in communication have radically altered the way humans 
communicate with one another. For almost all of human history, the ability to harness and 
create communication technology was limited to a select few who possessed the means to 
produce it, whether the means were scriptoriums, printing presses, or movie sets. The 20th 
century brought drastic changes in mass media production. Newspapers, cinemas, and 
radio programs allowed communication to reach wide audiences for the first time. 
However, this new mass media production was capital intensive and required specific, 
technical knowledge that limited the ability of an average person to widely express his or 
her views. An individual could only disseminate this mass media within his or her limited 
geographic space, personal networks, or both. An individual could only pass media 
beyond his or her immediate social network in designated public spaces, such as town 
hall meetings, and town squares. 
While separate from mass media like newspapers or radio shows, widespread 
access to telephone technology was the first change in how people could interact with one 
another. Telephone technology broke down geographic space, allowing people to 
communicate with their personal network immediately, regardless of physical distance. 
Letter writing and telegraph systems were slow and limited by specific governmental or 
corporate offices that controlled access as middlemen. However, telephone technology 
has limitations. An individual was still confined to communicating with his or her 
immediate social network and telecommunication companies, with limitations on 
infrastructure development, limited communication to specific groups of people. 
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While telephone technology broke down geographic space, audiocassettes were a 
further radical development in communication technology. The “little media”1 removed 
control of production and dissemination from governments and large corporations. 
Individuals could produce and copy audiocassettes without a large, capital intensive 
operation.  However, the ability to disseminate audiocassette tapes was limited by 
geography, due to their physical nature. Therefore, while an individual could, in theory, 
disseminate his or her own views, realistically, only major religious and political voices 
had the importance to achieve a widespread geographic distribution. 
Fax technology represents an intermediate technology. It shares the benefits of 
both telephones and audiocassettes. Like telephones, fax machines broke down 
geographic boundaries; an individual could communicate across large distances with only 
a phone line. Furthermore, like audiocassettes, producing and copying communication 
was cheap and relatively accessible. However, one could only send messages to a defined 
list of fax numbers, limiting reach to specific, closed networks. Like telephones, fax 
communication is also limited by infrastructure development and technological 
availability.  
So called “New Social Media” appears to overcome all of the limitations of 
earlier technologies. New Social Media (NSM)2 is a set of diverse Internet 
communication technology that arose in the 21st century. It includes self-publishing 
                                                                 
1
Hamid Naficy, "Cassettes." In The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World., edited by John L. 
Esposito. Oxford Islamic Studies Online, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236MIW/e0140  
(accessed 01-Apr-2014). 
2
 I use NSM to refer only to New Social Media. While NSM sometimes refers to New Social Movement 
theory, which I will discuss later, I will spell out New Social Movement, while abbreviating New Social 
Media. 
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formats like blogs, social network communities like Facebook, and widespread micro-
blogging platforms like Twitter and Tumblr. While these platforms function differently in 
Cyberspace, they all overcome the limitations of previous media. The average individual 
now has the ability to disseminate his or her views worldwide, cheaply, and outside a 
personal network. This new communication technology is immensely powerful; however, 
it presents new limitations for mass communication. 
Many commentators were quick to announce the 2011 revolutions throughout the 
Arab world as a social media revolution.3 Analysts attributed mass protests to the unique 
characteristics of NSM. People were able to organize, disseminate news, and share 
worldwide information outside of state controlled media. This analysis ignored many 
fundamental social factors in many countries, for example in Egypt. Unemployment was 
high and youth unemployment was astronomical. The unique history of repression and 
political corruption was virtually forgotten. When commentators considered that only 5 
million of Egypt’s 80 million people actually used social media, the attention turned to 
new media as instrumental in accelerating the pace of traditional political movements. 
New Media provided alternative forms of communication that allowed people to organize 
outside traditional political systems, exploiting social ills to create an activism beyond its 
inherently limited reach. 
Many scholars have argued that New Social Media, by breaking down geographic 
and networked boundaries, provides a new nexus for democratic activism. Manuel 
                                                                 
3
Alexia Tsotsis, "Mubarak Shut Down the Internet, and The Internet Paid Him in Kind," TechCrunch, 
February 11, 2011. 
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Castells4 and Sidney Tarrow5 have argued that marginalized groups previously excluded 
from mainstream political activity, such as women, transgendered people, queer people, 
and secularists, now have a platform to express ideas and policy positions. These groups 
can safely dissent from prominent ideological positions, thus opening a new arena for 
public discourse. Castells argues that changes in communication technology break down 
personal social networks entirely. Tarrrow elaborates on this concept, postulating that this 
new technology allows individuals to organize outside traditional political groups like 
political parties, labor unions, and NGOs. Furthermore, by eradicating geographic 
boundaries, NSM allows for transnational activism. This new activism unites individuals 
previously unconnected by local political organizations; most importantly, this new 
transnational activism unites disparate people primarily by ideological affiliation. 
Environmental, anti-nuclear, and religious movements, e.g., transcend the localized 
nature of political structures to create global movements, united by a common ideological 
cause.  
Scholars such as Dale Eickelman, Jon Anderson6, and Gary Bunt7, following 
Habermas’, have postulated this new platform as a widening of the traditional “Public 
Sphere.” While Habermas considered Mass Media as a unique subject in the Public 
Sphere, NSM allows individuals to communicate their own ideas in a mass context. 
                                                                 
4
 Manuel Castells, The Rise of The Network Society (Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishers, 1996) 
5
 Sidney G. Tarrow. The New Transnational Activism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 
6
 Dale F. Eickelman  and Jon W. Anderson, New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Public 
Sphere,  2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003) 
7
 Gary R. Bunt, Virtually Islamic: Computer-Mediated Communication and Cyber Islamic Environments 
(Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2000) 
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Changes in technology caused many scholars to view the Public Sphere as “widened,” 
allowing new voices previously excluded to enter into public dialogue. 
 If we are to follow this scholarly consensus, NSM will bypass traditional political 
and media structures entirely, ushering in a new area of globalized democratic activism. 
NSM, by breaking down geographic and personal networks, undermines the prevailing 
order. Previously marginalized groups have the ability to bypass rigid political structures 
and social movements can organize across national boundaries. However, I will offer an 
important caveat to this literature. While changes in communication technology have 
broken down many geographic barriers, Internet platforms are neither as open nor as 
democratic as the literature suggests. Online platforms also give room to reactionary, 
anti-democratic forces that have been excluded from the political process. One only 
needs to glance at the comment sections of YouTube videos or major news publications 
to see the vitriolic misogynist, racist hate spewed on a regular basis. No major news 
outlet would publish an opinion piece containing the bile of these comment sections. 
Even the commentators would be unlikely to attach their names to such comments if their 
neighbors, family, and friends could see them. Only the relative anonymity afforded by 
the Internet allows these voices to enter public discourse. Furthermore, traditional 
institutions—political and religious—have made use of this new technology. From 
official government press releases online to the Pope’s Twitter account, traditional 
structures also engage in cyberspace. Online platforms represent a new sphere of 
contested political space, not merely a new platform for “liberal” or “left-wing” groups. 
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 My research demonstrates that, while NSM creates a new form of open public 
space, this space still reflects many of the same ideological and gendered boundaries of 
physical space. The fact that changes in technology give voices to marginalized groups 
does not mean these new participants can access all aspects of cyberspace equally. Many 
forums and blogs maintain strict ideological homogeneity, eliminating dissenting views 
from the discussion. Groups often use language coding, with particular words marking a 
space as belonging to a specific ideology; for example, the word “jihad” is traditionally 
used in Islamic jurisprudence to denote state-sanctioned warfare. However, on militant 
Islamist forums, it denotes a specific individual obligation to attack “imperialist powers,” 
primarily Israel and the United States. However, both the word and the concept of jihad 
do not exist without context. Instead, jihad is tied to the concepts like “kaffir”; on jihadist 
sites, “kaffir” is divorced from Islamic jurisprudence on apostasy, meaning, instead, a 
particular kind of American or European political persuasion. It also includes those 
Muslims who are perceived to be sympathetic to any kind of cosmopolitan liberalism.  
It is not the word itself that codes meaning, but the wider context that the word is 
deployed. According to the cultural anthropologist Clifford Geertz, ritual acts are 
symbolic acts, which serve to create and reify a wider cultural system.8 In Islam 
Observed, Geertz analyzes religious development, with a particular focus on saint 
veneration and religious syncretism, to interpret a specific cultural milieu that impacts 
politics and all facets of daily life in Morocco and Indonesia. While Geertz never 
discounts speech as a ritual act, speech occurs within a wider cultural system. The basis 
                                                                 
8
Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia  (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1968) 
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of Geertz’s “thick description” is placing symbolic acts within a wider cultural context. 
However, cyberspace is unique because speech is the only ritual act. Unlike physical 
space, there are no familial relationships, political orders, or religious practices in which 
to place online speech. Cyberspace, by its very nature, hides the person who is 
commentating, tweeting, or blogging. Language, as a symbolic act, is the only way to 
define a space as “belonging” to a specific group. This language coding, and the specific 
discursive genealogies that define it, serve as one of the primary ways online space can 
close itself to dissent.  
Following Geertz, to understand a particular symbol within a cultural system, one 
needs to look at the wider context in which it is deployed. However, in cyberspace, a 
researcher can only look at language coding itself. Despite the limitations inherent in 
looking at language outside physical and cultural contexts, participants in online 
communities only experience linguistic symbols as well. Participants observe their fellow 
commentators and bloggers only through language. As such, language norms take on a 
specific symbolic characteristic that can create a cultural system in a relatively small 
space. While all communities develop specific slang or common expressions, these 
linguistic symbols take on a particular important in online communities.  
In addition to ideological homogeneity, some online spaces enforce strict gender 
norms and define who “legitimate” voices in the discussion are. While the cloak of 
anonymity undoubtedly gives previously marginalized groups, such as women or queer 
individuals, the ability to participate in wider public conversations, these voices are often 
perceived not to exist. In closed online communities, commentators assume the 
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community to be homogenous. As such, whether or not a commentator on a blog or 
forum is a member of a marginalized group, the commentator is perceived to not be a 
member of this group. I will argue that when online space is partitioned along ideological 
or gendered lines, dissenting voices, regardless of whether they exist in physical space, 
are minimalized. 
 These problems are particularly pronounced in Salafi, a strict form of Islam that 
emphasizes literal emulation of the prophet Mohammad, online communities. Religious 
communities make truth claims that raise the stakes beyond political disagreements; 
instead, they tend to rest on meta- worldviews or ontological claims. This produces a 
specific kind of ideological community. Furthermore, Salafi communities are able to 
draw on a particular strain of Wahhabi fiqh, or Islamic jurisprudence, to justify a rigid 
separation of gender roles. While online space is open to anyone, specific practices can 
mark a space as closed to outsiders. I will use the online space inhabited by conservative 
Muslim religious communities to argue for a more refined conception of a widened 
Public Sphere. 
 Many Salafi forums, such as IslamicAwakening, display evidence of 
administrative monitoring, deleting commentators and posts that violate communal 
norms. Furthermore, there are strict gender policies enforced on forums like SunniForum 
and SalafiTalk. Online space tends to be ideologically segregated and controlled. These 
specific administrative policies and cultural systems limit the ability of marginalized 
voices to enter public discussion. Alternative voices of dissent are assumed not to exist in 
these segregated communities. As such, the efficacy of a “new democratic activism” 
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should be approached more cautiously. Even if the commentators are actually women, 
queer individuals, or marginalized political groups, these voices are assumed not to exist. 
 In order to analyze this particular kind of online activity, I focus on two specific 
NSM platforms. The first is online forums, where any registered users may comment. In 
this regard, I focused on both English and Arabic language jihadi forums. I also, analyzed 
Salafi forums that are not explicitly militant but may contain many commentators and 
threads sympathetic to militant groups and ideology. In June 2013, I archived the forums 
back to one year and monitored the forums until March 2014 for new content. In some 
instances, I skipped over threads that I believed were irrelevant to my research (such as 
discussions of family law or cooking recipes); however, the data is representative of two 
years of monitoring these forums.  
 The second platform I researched was Somali and Somali diaspora Twitter 
accounts. Due to the fact that many Twitter accounts are transient and can be deleted or 
blocked, I only monitored new activity from June 2013 onward. I collected the data by 
focusing on responses to official Kenyan Twitter accounts, particularly the Kenyan 
Defense Forces and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).I monitored 
responses to these accounts at least once every two weeks. I then used the accounts that 
responded to the KDF and AMISOM to build networks of affiliated accounts based on 
Tweet interaction and common followers. Compared to the systemic analysis of forum 
communities, which was relatively comprehensive, I was unable to analyze micro-
blogging platforms as completely. While sample size is impossible to determine, one year 
of constant monitoring gave me a significant database of accounts and tweet interactions. 
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At its best, Internet research can only give evidence of broad trends, not definitive proof. 
There are no P-tests to determine statistical significance or and there is no way to 
measure a quality sample size. As such, research into cyberspace is only a call to further 
research. 
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The Traditional Public Sphere: 
The phrase “Public Sphere” has thoroughly entered our common political lexicon.  
Overwhelmingly, both the common and academic debate about public space is been 
based on the work of German sociologist Jürgen Habermas. Habermas obviously did not 
invent the concept of “public;” as a legal term it goes back at least as far as res publica in 
the Roman Republic. However, Habermas lays out a history of the modern conception of 
a public sphere, as distinct from legal “public things,” in The Structural Transformation 
of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society.9 Habermas 
isolates the genealogical history of the public sphere within French salons and London 
coffee houses. The distinction is drawn primarily between public and private space. 
Public space follows the bourgeois concepts of objective common interest, while private 
space is of individual interest. Furthermore, the most important concept in original 
Habermassian public space discourse is its geographic, physical nature. The spaces are 
both physical and political.  
For Habermas, these locations form the institutionalization of communicative 
action,10 leading to the emancipation of human rationality. Rationality is inherent in 
language.11 As such, collective argumentation and discussion in public are reflections of 
deeper rationality. Habermas has a prescriptive understanding of public communication; 
not only do argumentation and discussion happen but, when they do, they uncover deeper 
                                                                 
9  rgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1991) 
10
 For Habermas’ discussion of Communicative Action, see volumes 1 and 2: 
  rgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984) 
11
 For contemporary discussions, see: 
Axel Honneth and Hans Joas, Communicative Action: E           rgen Habermas's The Theory of 
Communicative Action ( Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1991) 
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structures of rationality that inform political beliefs and policy. This prescriptive view of 
communication requires a forum for open dialogue, free from political or ideological 
coercion. Private space is that space that is removed from the common interest; therefore, 
by its very nature, it is separate from communicative action.  
With communicative action, Habermas moved away from the explicitly physical 
characterization of the public sphere; instead, he described the public sphere as the arena 
of speech acts.12 When people come together and speak or debate about the public 
interest, this speech act effectively creates the public sphere. However, crucial in the 
revised conception of public sphere, Habermas stresses the media as a subjective actor 
that plays an independent role in affecting public discussion. The mass media is a unique 
actor, separate from other voices, that uniquely contributes to public debate.  
Habermas is not without detractors in his views on the public discourse. While 
most writers accept his distinction between private and public speech, particularly with 
regard to politics, several commentators criticizes Habermas’ prescriptive extolling of 
communicative action. Several authors, Chantal Mouffe chief among them, have 
criticized Habermas for ignoring power relations in debate, particularly along racial, 
class, and gendered lines.13  
According to these authors, certain voices are privileged while others are 
minimized. Mouffe places Habermas in the wider tradition of left liberalism with John 
                                                                 
12
 For an overview of Habermas’ discussion of the Public Sphere, see: 
  rgen Habermas and Steven Seidman,                   Society and Politics: A Reader (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1989): 231-237. 
13
 For a detailed discussion of so-called “difference democrats,” see: 
Lincoln Dahlberg, "The Habermasian Public Sphere: Taking Difference Seriously?" Theory and Society 34, 
no. 2 (April 2005): 111-36. 
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Rawls, as both believed an individual could suspend bias and prejudice to advocate for 
the common good. This is not to say that Mouffe rejects Habermas; instead, she and 
others with similar critiques are attempts to refine his view. Particularly, discursive power 
structures represent the primary impediment to communicative action. 
Freedom from ideological or political coercion is central to Habermas’ theory of 
communicative action. Rationality can only emanate from public argumentation and 
discussion when that speech is “free.” Mouffe and other difference democrats maintain 
that no speech can ever be free or beyond coercion. Instead, it is limited by discursive 
structures; an African American woman cannot access public debate in the same way as a 
white male can. According to Mouffe, public space, in addition to public speech, is also 
limited by these discursive power structures. Women, ethnic minorities, or queer 
individuals can be excluded from the physical locations where public debate happens. 
Mouffe and other difference democrats thus place two conditions for an open 
public sphere, according to Habermas a necessary requirement for communicative action. 
Public spaces must be open to all individuals and, additionally, discursive power 
structures that privilege certain voices must be deconstructed and eliminated. Naturally, 
Mouffe is skeptical that this is possible; as such, Mouffe agrees with communicative 
action in theory, but disagrees with the possibility of coercion free public debate in 
practice. 
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Technology and the Expanded Public Sphere: 
 Habermas’ work was published in the mid-1980’s and it only describes the public 
sphere up until the 1970’s. While certain technologies, such as the telephone, broke down 
defined geographic space, communication was still limited to those in a personal 
network. Public discourse outside personal networks still occurred in defined public 
space: coffee shops, town hall meetings, etc.. Since that time, advances in technology 
broke down the geographic and personal aspects of the public sphere. Media ceased to be 
an independent actor in the public sphere; instead, media allow individuals to break 
outside their defined personal networks and geographic planes of existence. For 
Habermas, 20th century mass media, such as radio and television, participate in the public 
sphere. However, changes in communication technology allowed individuals to 
disseminate widely their personal views. These technological changes ended mass media 
as an independent actor in the public sphere. Instead, media are a way for average 
individuals to participate in the public sphere. 
 The first radical change in media technology occurred with the introduction of 
audiocassette tapes. In many ways, the dissemination of audiocassettes mirrors the 
previous dissemination of old media (cinema, pamphlets, books, newspapers, etc.). That 
is, few people used them to disseminate their own views; often, people would distribute 
cassette tapes similar to pamphlets. Disseminating others’ work was a political act but 
this did not mean that average individuals could project their own views very far. Unlike 
previous forms of communication, the production of audiocassettes could be highly 
decentralized. With old media, the enormous capital required in the production phase 
17 
 
(whether it be presses, cameras, or large staff) required it to be highly centralized.14 This 
centralized production, by nature, gave the creators significant control over dissemination 
of the medium. By contrast, audiocassettes can be easily recorded, copied, and 
disseminated by virtually anyone. In the 1970’s and 1980’s, this decentralized process 
allowed the dissemination of the khutubat and fatawa of relatively unknown sheikhs who 
previously lacked accessed to traditional media and whose views were limited to an 
immediate environment.15 
 The political effects of audiocassettes were felt most potently during the Iranian 
Revolution.16 Prior to the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini recorded sermons in exile from 
Iran, which were smuggled into Iran and widely copied and disseminated by nearly 
200,000 mullahs and 90,000 mosques.17 This informal media dissemination was an 
alternative to the Pahlavi regime and allowed individuals widespread access to dissenting 
views. Many new media scholars have dubbed the Iranian Revolution the “Cassette 
Revolution,” due to the large part the technology played in political activity. However, 
despite its importance, the physical nature of the technology was fairly limiting. 
Audiocassettes require a large network of people to copy and disseminate views. Even 
though these networks were largely informal in Iran, the sheer number of people required 
                                                                 
14
 Hamid Naficy, "Cassettes." In The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World., edited by John 
L. Esposito. Oxford Islamic Studies Online, 
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236MIW/e0140  (accessed 01-Apr-2014). 
15
 For an example of this process in Egypt, see:  
Charles Hirschkind, "Cassette Ethics: Public Piety and Popular  Media in Egypt," In Religion, Media, and 
the Public Sphere, edited by Birgit Meyer and Annelies Moors, 29-51 (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2006) 
16
Annabelle Sreberny‐Mohammadi, “The Power of Tradition: Communication and the Iranian Revolution,” 
Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1985. 
17
Majid Tehranian, Communication and Revolution in Iran: The Passing of a Paradigm. Iranian Studies  
13.1–4 (1980): 5–30. 
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for copying and distributing cassettes limited their effectiveness as vehicles public 
communication to important religious and political figures. Average individuals had 
almost no opportunity to record and disseminate their views. While audiocassettes played 
a major role in the Iranian Revolution, it was a now obsolete technology, with virtually 
no political ramifications, that drastically altered the power of individual voices in the 
public sphere. 
 The Telefax, developed by Xerox in 1964, was the first fax machine based on 
telephone technology. While many businesses and newsrooms had Telefaxes in the 
1970’s and 1980’s, it was only in the 1990’s that fax machines were relatively 
widespread among consumers. The fax machine provided the first opportunity for an 
average individual, possessing only a phone jack and a list of numbers, to express his or 
her views beyond a local, personal network.18 Despite the efforts of many antiroyalist 
activists to make fax machine politics in Saudi Arabia during the 1990’s the “Fax 
Machine Revolution,” no such insurgency materialized. However, individuals, for the 
first time, were able to disseminate their own writings, at very little cost, to a diverse 
group of readers outside their personal network. The costs were even lower than 
audiocassettes and, furthermore, fax machines entirely broke down the physical nature of 
technology. However, there were some notable limitations to the technology, not least the 
cost and availability of a machine in the 1990’s. Most importantly, an individual had to 
possess some list of fax numbers to send information. While physical and geographic 
                                                                 
18
 For a detailed history of early Fax machine politics in Saudi Arabia, see: 
Dale F. Eickelman  and Jon W. Anderson, New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere ,  
2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003) 
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boundaries were broken down, an individual still had a defined readership, subject to his 
or her list of numbers. 
 While access to computers, particularly in the Middle East, was generally limited 
to wealthy urbanites in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, the development of the Internet 
(or The Web, in 1990’s parlance) for the first time allowed private individuals to 
communicate, entirely anonymously, with users anywhere in the world.19 Early forum 
communities not only broke down geographic barriers, allowing a Saudi to chat with an 
American in Dearborn, for example, but also allowed the average individual to have 
complete control over production and worldwide dissemination of his or her ideas. 
Individuals were no longer confined by limited networks; by definition, the ability to 
communicate anonymously put the societal-changing effects of 20th century mass media 
in the hands of everyday people. Not only were individuals able to project their voices 
but they were also able to consume user-generated information from anywhere in the 
world.  
 For many scholars, the fact that, with the development of the Internet, individuals 
were no longer confined by geography, immediate social and familial networks, or 
centralized production, called for a radical reevaluation of what the “public sphere” 
means. For many, new media ended Mouffe and others’ critique of power relations. 
Individuals traditionally excluded from the public sphere had access to a medium to share 
their views. Anonymity in particular allowed groups marginalized from public debate, 
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 For an excellent discussion of early Muslim forum communities, see: 
Gary R. Bunt, Virtually Islamic: computer-mediated communication and cyber Islamic environments 
(Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2000) 
20 
 
such as women, queer people, and secularists, a platform to engage in wider political 
discussion. 
 Nowhere was the importance of this development apparent more than in New 
Social Movement theory. While traditional activism had been defined by associations 
with hierarchical leaders (e.g. labor bosses, party apparatchik, and community 
organizers), a new form of political activity began to arise in the 1980’s. Rather than 
political association, these new movements were organized loosely by ideology.20 This is 
not to say that previous political organizations were devoid of ideology. Instead, the 
groups combined ideology with traditional forms of political association. Furthermore, an 
individual could join these groups for non-ideological reasons; many members of the 
Communist Party in the USSR joined to experience the social, political, and economic 
benefits. What separates New Social Movement theory is that individuals can organize 
without these structures, based only on ideological agreement. While several scholars 
associated with New Social Movement theory give a great deal of thought to 
marginalized extremist groups, for example Sidney Tarrow’s discussion of the Muslim 
Brotherhood,21 the overwhelming theme is that this breakdown in dominant political 
structures brings new opportunities for previously minimal left-wing groups like ACT 
UP, anti-capitalist groups, and radical eco-terrorists. Tarrow sees al-Qaeda as 
symptomatic of the dominant political structures; al-Qaeda is simply a result of US 
backed Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, which gave political space to Islamists. Instead, I 
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 Castells sees this trend as affecting all aspects of human life, from work to time to death. However, his 
work is an excellent starting point for New Social Movement theory, see: 
Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishers, 1996) 
21
 For a relatively comprehensive treatment of this trend, see: 
Sidney G. Tarrow. The New Transnational Activism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 
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will argue as a caveat the al-Qaeda inhabits the same fragmented political space as 
Greenpeace. While changes in communication technology have allowed for significant 
political activity outside established political structures, this widened political space is 
not unidirectional. 
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Limitations of the “Widened Public Sphere” 
 The major problem with this understanding of the development of the Internet 
leading to a widened public sphere is the tendency to see the enlargement as 
unidirectional.22 As a general rule, governments have marginalized both the far left and 
the far right.23 Most authors have extolled the virtues of a new medium for women, queer 
people, secularists, and other marginalized groups, while ignoring that far-right, anti-
democratic voices have often been excluded from political organization as well. By 
breaking down geographic and networked boundaries, new media breaks down structures 
in both directions. In America, this has resulted in a resurgence of far-right survivalist 
Internet boards; while in many parts of the world, radical Islamists are exploiting a new 
political space. 
 Furthermore, authors have tended to see this new online space as open space, or at 
least more open than traditional physical public space. In many ways, this is true. 
Particularly, women and people of color have more access to media dissemination. 
However, a general opening of public debate does not mean all of these spaces are 
“open.” In fact, online space tends to be highly moderated and partitioned, particularly at 
the far ends of the political spectrum. This ideological moderating takes two forms. The 
first is hard moderating, where dissenting views are deleted and alternative commentators 
are banned. The second is discursive moderating, where particular language codes a 
space as a certain type of space, whether that space is anarchist, male, Salafi, or feminist. 
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Furthermore, this language can often code a space as gendered, even when the space may 
not be explicitly male or female. 
 There are profound methodological difficulties in demonstrating that online space 
is highly moderated. For starters, one is trying to prove a negative, that the absence of 
dissent is evidence of hard moderating. However, there are several elements that provide 
evidence for hard moderating. The first is the percentage of commentators who are 
banned on older threads. Most open forums rarely ban users except for explicit violations 
of forum rules. Meanwhile, heavily policed forums or comment sections often have a 
higher percentage of banned users. While forums will often show the older members who 
have been banned, the comments sections of blogs will often erase evidence of their 
existence. For blogs, dissent on other blogs or forums regarding the policing policies of 
certain platforms is often good evidence that such behavior is happening. These factors 
are soft and difficult to prove; however, in general they provide evidence for the 
existence of the moderating policies of a certain blog. Most importantly, heavily 
moderated platforms often have ambiguous rules that can be used to remove dissenting 
views, while more open blogs usually have extremely hard rules that will usually result in 
a warning before a banning. 
 As an example, one of the most prominent Salafi forums is the UK-based 
IslamicAwakening. Looking to forums from year ago, nearly 20% of contributors are 
listed as banned. The first rule of the forum is to “adhere to correct Islamic adab 
(etiquette) while discussing or debating issues.”24 Furthermore, rather than a warning, 
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violations result in “an immediate ban.”25 The coupling of a rather ambiguous etiquette 
rule26 with harsh immediate banning policy, combined with a very high rate of banned 
users, is good evidence of high moderator policing. On the other end of the political 
spectrum, the pro-fat feminist blog, Shakesville, uses safe space and anti-trigger rhetoric 
to police its content. While all evidence of that moderating has been removed, there are 
significant numbers of blogs and micro-blogs run primarily by women of color, which 
have criticized Shakesville’s heavy-handed policing policies.27 It is worth mentioning one 
of the criticisms at length: 
“Over the past 10 to 15 years in particular, feminist spaces have been concerned with and 
consumed by an Ahab like quest for building and enforcing “safe space.” As women of 
color, who live under white supremacy, settler colonialism, heteronormativity, capitalism 
and more, we know that such a place doesn’t actually exist. More importantly, what we 
have seen over the years is that “safe spaces” usually mean excluding us. They 
sometimes mean using “safety” as a substitute for “never uncomfortable spaces.” In this 
conceptualization, safety is often used as a cudgel to silence and to further marginalize.”28 
While it is impossible to prove the absence of something (e.g. dissent), evidence through 
alternative mediums of moderator policing gives credence to the theory that online space 
is not nearly as open as much of the literature would like us to believe. 
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 Beyond hard moderating, the language of forums and blogs and their contributors 
often discursively marks a space. Often, this can be in the title, as in the Arabic language 
Sahab Salafi Network, clearly demarcating the space. However, certain, less obvious, 
behaviors can also mark a space. Blogs where even short posts begin with the bismalah 
or the shahada universally occur in every post are almost always Salafi in orientation. 
Furthermore, certain forums can gender space by referring to everyone as brother 
(whether or not there are women on the forum).  
 The implications of this moderating are significant. Traditional literature on the 
subject has emphasized the value of anonymous female and queer voices in traditionally 
male space. However, I will argue that because these voices are assumed not to exist due 
to moderating, the impact of these voices is marginalized. Whether a female is 
anonymously commenting in a male forum is less important than whether the male space 
believes the voice is female. I will argue that lacking physical and social cues, online 
space tends to rely on highly ideological and gendered language to partition the Internet 
and form groups. While new media does cause a widening of the public sphere, this new 
space tends to reflect ideological and gendered differences of physical space. 
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The New Public Sphere in Practice: 
 In order to study how online space can be partitioned along ideological and 
gendered line, I focused on two different types of partitioned space on forum 
communities as well as the microblogging platform Twitter. 
Salafi Internet Boards: 
 
 When we discuss online communities, the question is always about authority. 
Whether it be religion or political ideology, a member is only considered part of the 
group because some tradition has issued a verdict that they are allowed to be there. 
Islamist Internet boards mix these two elements, attempting to solidify religious and 
ideological authority. 
 In terms of establishing religious authority, a particular kind of new media is 
especially important. Forums, blogs, and micro-blogging platforms (such as Twitter or 
Tumbler) are fairly interactive. A commentator or member is able to respond to, 
disseminate, or block/remove certain types of material from their own online experience. 
However, an important subset of new media is media repositories. In a religious context, 
these sites have extensive, downloadable PDFs or photocopies of religious texts. Often, a 
majority of the texts will be fiqh texts. However, the site may also include anasheed, 
fatawaa, or examples of tajweed. Compared to forums and blogs, the sites are far less 
interactive. A person will simply use the site to access an extremely large repository of 
texts; the sites function as free online libraries. Occasionally, sites will allow visitors to 
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rate texts with a star system29 or crowdsource the texts, which requires much more 
interactions.30 
 English language media repositories are slightly different. The ability to 
download books is often part of a much larger media project. English language sites will 
devote significant space to Arabic language learning tools,31 Arabic typography 
programs, information for new converts, and explanations of suwar and sunan.3233 There 
are also several websites devoted to creating a searchable database of a particular text, 
normally either a specific tafsir34 work or the Qur’an.35 While these sites are relatively 
closed (e.g. the generally lack message boards or forums), they provide a major source of 
religious authority on other forums and blogs. 
 The use of the textual repositories is most apparent on jihadi forums when 
discussing three key issues. The first is whether jihad allows one to kill innocents not 
engaged in combat. The second is whether it is acceptable to kill other Muslims during 
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the course of battle. The third concerns whether it is permissible to commit suicide36 in 
the name of jihad. It is the first two questions that form the bulk of debate and where the 
interaction with online religious texts is most widespread. The first question, concerning 
the killing of civilians, was addressed (in the view of certain groups) by 8th century jurist 
Muhammad al-Shaybani. Al-Shaybani addressed the question in terms of siege warfare. 
Specifically, whether it acceptable to fire a mangonel at a city during a siege if it would 
almost certainly kill some non-combatants who resided there. Al-Shaybani determined 
this was acceptable in the context of siege warfare. The second question, of killing 
Muslims as collateral damage during warfare, was addressed by Ibn Taymiyyah. After 
the Mongol invasion, the question arose, during the attempt to retake Mongol held cities 
where Muslims lived, was it acceptable to kill Muslims living there in the course of the 
siege? While the killing of Muslims is explicitly forbidden under shari’a, Ibn Taymiyyah 
concluded that this was permissible under the “doctrine of the shield.” That is, if an 
enemy used civilians or Muslims as a human shield, it was permissible that they die in 
the course of killing the enemy. While these specific legal doctrines have little 
applicability to suicide bombings or other “martyrdom operations,”37 these legal ideas are 
often discussed in this context online. 
 The normal course of this discussion is that a forum member will ask a question 
about the permissibility of suicide bombings, military actions with large civilian 
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casualties, etc.. Another commentator will then respond with “Ibn Taymiyya38 supports 
such actions under the “doctrine of the shield” and provide a link, from one of the textual 
repositories, to a 700 page PDF document of fatawaa. There is never discussion of 
military fiqh, Mohammad’s early military actions,39 or relevant chapters in the Qur’an. 
Instead, the “sheikh al-Islam” has authority in his own right. By providing a link to the 
entire collection of fatawaa, the post, and its commentary on warfare, is given religious 
authority. Often, the post will not even quote from the text; it will simply provide the link 
as though this is self-evident. The texts are not studied; instead, the texts themselves are 
evidence of authority. 
 Earlier, I discussed the UK-based Salafi forum IslamicAwakening, particularly, 
how its loose forum rules allow for controlling and moderating ideology. The forum 
explicitly bans “anything that may incriminate you for ‘glorifying’ or ‘inciting 
terrorism’…[which is] illegal under UK law”40 (emphasis added). However, 
commentators may “discuss theoretical aspects [of jihad] in theological terms without 
specifying a place or time.”41 Additionally, while “links to  ihad videos will be 
removed,”42 the forum is clear it is acceptable as long as it is not the “primary platform to 
disseminate highly controversial political material (such as latest al-Qaeda , IRA, Tamil 
Tiger news, etc.)”43 (emphasis in original). However, as long as a post “is linked to its 
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primary source,”44 it is acceptable. The results of these loose, ambiguous rules are 
popular threads (as of writing) such as “al-Shabaab winning hearts & minds of the 
public”45 and “Islamic State ‘strong enough to occupy Baghdad.’”46 While these threads 
contain content that violates the “incitement to violence rules,” they provide links to other 
jihadi news organizations and forums; the “primary source” and “abstract theological 
debate” clauses give a great deal of leeway to those who are in ideological agreement 
with the community. Unsurprisingly, similar platforms are not open for Shi’i Islamists, 
Marxists, or Lebanese Christian Militias. Although, there is the “Slaughter of ahlul 
Sunnah in Iran”47 thread which criticizes the “so-called Islamic revolution in Iran,” 
amassing 300 views in only 3 days. However, there still is some moderating, often 
pushed by European anti-hate speech laws. For example, on March 31st, 2014, a thread on 
“The possibility of a pure Sunni Middle East” was removed, likely because several 
commentators had actively advocated for a purge of Shi’is and Christians. However, it is 
clear from the rules that these blogs have, at the core of their moderating policies, a desire 
to stay within the law in the broadest sense possible. A great deal of leeway is given to 
those in broad agreement with the ideology of the forum in general. 
 These sites often use weak moderating policies (for those who agree in tone and 
ideology) to link to official organs of jihadi groups. For example, it is easy to find links to 
as-Sahab, the official media outlet of al-Qaeda, on the Salafi forum SalafiTalk.48 Even 
though a commentator may be forbidden, especially in a European context, from 
                                                                 
44
 Ibid. 
45
 At the time of writing it had over 500 views in only 5 days. 
46
 At writing it had 4373 views. 
47
 Forums.islamicawakening.com/f18/slaughter-of-ahlul-sunnah-in-Iran-69510/ 
48
 www.salafitalk.net 
31 
 
explicitly inciting people to violence, links take other commentators to official jihadi 
media organizations that do. The informal forum networks and official public relations 
organs have a symbiotic relationship. Forum commentators can circumvent hate speech 
laws by posting al-Qaeda affiliated links with a “what do you think of this?” Meanwhile, 
the official media accounts depend on the informal networks to disseminate press releases 
and new information, as traditional media often refuses to do so.49 
 This symbiotic relationship is particularly apparent with al-Qaeda’s two high 
profile magazines, Inspire and al-Shamikha. Some journalists and commentators, such as 
Max Fischer writing in the Atlantic, believe the magazines to be elaborate hoaxes. While 
it is unlikely the magazines are tied to high-level leadership, both were distributed by as-
Sahab and are believed to originate from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Inspire is a 
high gloss, English- language publication targeted at youth in the United States and the 
UK. While print editions do exist, the magazine is primarily disseminated on online 
forums. It is currently in its 12th edition. The most recent edition encouraged recruits to 
launch car bombs in major American cities,  
Many Feisal Shahzads are residing inside America and all they need is the knowledge of how to 
make car bombs….The American government was unable to protect its citizens from pressure 
cooker bombs in backpacks, I wonder if they are ready to stop car bombs! And the good news 
is…you can prepare it in the kitchen of your mom too.50 
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At the same time, al-Qaeda also announced the release of a new English language 
magazine entitled Resurgence51. New issues are met with considerable fanfare on Jihadi 
websites as well as extended press coverage. 
 The second major al-Qaeda publication is al-Shamikha, an Arabic-language 
magazine geared towards women. While it only ran for one issue in March 2011, making 
the ties to al-Qaeda leadership even weaker,  it is still widely discussed online. This is 
due, in no small part, to its very interesting content. Columns that extoll the benefits of 
marrying a mujahid are placed haphazardly next to cooking tips. One woman wrote a 
self-reflection of having her husband participate in a suicide attack.  
 These high gloss magazines generate a significant amount of coverage in 
American and European news; the Daily Mail sarcastically referred to al-Shamikha as a 
jihadi’s Cosmo.52 Al-Qaeda relies on forums, as well as the significant Western media 
coverage, to widely disseminate the magazines. 
 Forums can also use the aforementioned discursive monitoring to define the 
ideology of a site. In many conservative Salafi and jihadi forums, every post will begin 
with the bismallah, normally reserved for long speeches or books. Furthermore, many 
commentators will include the shahada at the end of their posts or in their biography. 
These practices do not serve a theological purpose; instead, they serve to reify the 
religious authority, and specific ideology, of the commentators. 
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 These processes tend to create closed ideological communities. Commentators 
discuss Americans as “kuffar” as a matter of fact, not as a matter of Islamic law. Unread 
700 page PDF files grant the commentators a certain amount of religious authority while 
links to official jihadi media outlets can be used to circumvent European anti-hate speech 
laws. 
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Gendered Online Space: 
In addition to having a high degree of ideological homogeneity, online forums 
tend to be highly gendered. Salafi religious sites tend to take three forms with regard to 
gender. The first are sites that are clearly geared towards Muslim women. However, as 
we shall see, many women on the sites are aware of the fact that men are participating, 
even if they are not explicitly doing so. The second type of site is presumed to be entirely 
male. Whether or not women are actually participating is somewhat of a moot point as 
they are not seen to be participating. The third type of site is a mixed-gender online 
space. However, these sites often enforce strict online behavior based on gender, 
restricting commentators of a certain gender from participating in certain sections of the 
website or from interacting with users of another gender. 
 Sites that are dedicated forums for Muslim women are extremely widespread 
online. One of the most popular Arabic language sites is Hawaa World. The site is geared 
towards non-working women and a majority of the threads are tips to improve daily life; 
it includes sections on cooking, pregnancy and motherhood, decorating ideas, and 
others.53 There is also a large section on personal budgeting and ideas for at-home 
businesses. Particularly, there are many posts on stock trading. However, these very 
practical threads are also interspersed with religious themed threads. There is an 
extremely active section on living properly as Muslim women; it includes religious 
counsel as well as advice for memorizing the Qur’an. As of writing, it had over 100,000 
threads and nearly 2,000,000 posts.  
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 While the site is exclusively targeted at Muslim women, there is evidence that the 
commentators are aware of men on the forums. The “Beauty and Elegance” section is 
also extremely popular. Interestingly, in the section description, it specifically asks men 
not to enter this particular area of the website. Other sites, such as Islam Way Sisters, a 
subset of the major d ’w   (proselytizing) website Islam Way, take a much stricter 
approach. Islam Way Sisters only has closed threads; that is, only registered users can 
even enter sections to view open threads. The only thread open to the public is one that 
provides information about Islam for non-Muslims, fitting the wider d ’w   theme of 
Islam Way.54 
 While sites targeting Muslim women have most of the same religious resources 
such as tools for memorizing the Qur’an and studying the hadith, there are some 
important differences. Most of the sites entirely ignore the conversations about fiqh that 
make up a significant portion of the previously discussed forums. However, Muslim 
women forums often have unique forms of religious expression that are quite rare 
elsewhere. One of these unique platforms is dedicated threads where a verified sheikh can 
answer questions that people have.55 Another prominent mode of religious expression on 
Muslim women forums is personalized dream interpretation.  
 Dream interpretation is, in no way, a specifically female activity. As a practice, 
sanctioned dream interpretation goes back to the time of the Prophet. Additionally, 
hundreds of sites have appeared on the Internet, allowing an individual to search general 
terms for common themes. MyIslamicDream is one of the most popular sites for this kind 
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of broad-search dream interpretation.56 However, personalized dream interpretation, 
whether over the phone, email, or chat, is extremely popular. Yet, in many ways, this 
online personalized dream interpretation is under attack from a variety of fronts. 
 Several religious leaders have criticized the validity of dreams to make 
predictions. A fatwa57 issued by Sheikh ‘Atiyyah Saqr, former head of Azhar’s Fatwa 
committee, is featured on dozens of English- language Salafi blogs: 
As for interpretation of dreams, this issue is certainly one of hidden secrets known only to 
Almighty Allah, the Knower of the Unseen. So all that is written or said of the interpretation of 
dreams is just a matter of personal reasoning and is not reliable. This is because this issue is one of 
the Unseen matters that have something to do with spirits and their interaction with outer worlds. 
It is not true that it has certain laws; it is merely based on opinions through which some people 
issued many books claiming to be authoritative reference on interpreting dreams.
58
 
The implication is obvious. Dream interpretation is simply a personal opinion about 
religion; furthermore, when most dream interpretation occurs in informal settings, 
conducted by lay people, it is an uninformed religious opinion that should hold virtually 
no weight. Al-Qaradawi holds a similar view, “while not denying the theoretical 
possibility of dream-visions, [he] tries to contain their effectiveness.”59 Saleh bin Abdul-
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Aziz al ash-Sheikh, the minister of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Call and Guidance of 
Saudi Arabia holds a similar view on the matter.60 
 Moreover, these theological attitudes often exist in tandem with official efforts to 
limit certain kinds of dream interpretation. On April 20, 2009, the aforementioned Saleh 
bin Abdul-Aziz al ash-Sheikh issued an opinion that Saudi Arabia should curb dream 
interpreters who take payment for their work. The argument is that, as dreams are 
intangible, the transaction cannot meet the concreteness requirements of a    ’   (a 
sale).61 Saudi scholar Sheikh bin Abdullah al-Fawzan used a similar argument in a March 
2014 opinion declaring buffets haram because an individual cannot guarantee the amount 
of food they are buying when entering a buffet style restaurant. Ash-Sheikh’s opinion led 
to a Saudi crackdown on email and phone correspondence dream interpretation in the 
Kingdom. 
 While women are not the only people who seek out dream interpretation, Muslim 
women forums are one the major ways the phone numbers and emails of dream 
interpreters are disseminated. Hawaa World has two entire sections dedicated to dream 
interpretation. When dream interpretation is discussed on other forums, it is often in 
broad “general discussion” sections. The fact that many Muslim women forums give 
dedicated space to a specific kind of religious practice is rather unique and creates a 
unique kind of religious activity on these sites. 
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 While dream interpretation plays a major role on Muslim women forums, the 
practice is virtually absent from sites that primarily discuss fiqh or political activity. 
However, these sites go even farther, often using specific gendered language to code 
women out of religious and political conversations. On some forums, commentators 
exclusively refer to each other as “brothers” rather than “brothers and sisters.” Muslim 
women are assumed not to exist on these forums and it creates a culture of “these topics 
are clearly for men.” Even though women may be commentating and participating in 
these forums, they are assumed not to be. SalafiTalk is a major site where the 
commentators exclusively refer to each other as brothers. 
 There are also sites where both men and women comment freely. However, they 
often have strict moderating policies to maintain gender separation. IslamicAwakening 
has 7 rules to guide gender interactions on the website,  
1. Smiling or winking emoticons directed at the opposite gender are not allowed. 2. LOLing 
directly at the opposite gender's posts is not allowed. 3. Joking with the opposite gender is not 
allowed. 4. Excessively praising the opposite gender is not allowed. 5. Flattering the opposite 
gender is not allowed. 6. Declaring your love (for the sake of Allah) to the opposite gender is not 
allowed. 7. Friend requests should not be made to the opposite gender; this is considered free-
mixing and will be moderated.
62
 
IslamicAwakening attempts to mirror the strictest understanding of gender separation in 
online space. While women are invited to participate in various discussions, they are 
closed off from engaging with other commentators in many ways. A common feature of 
forum communities worldwide are direct messages, where forum conversations can be 
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extended privately and commentators can begin to build online networks. However, 
restrictions on “private” communication greatly limit women’s ability to form these 
online communities.  
Islamic sites that are explicitly mixed gender almost always require a person to 
identify their gender in their profile. This is true in English language sites like 
IslamicAwakening and SunniForum as well as Arabic language sites. This feature allows 
the site to restrict access to certain sections as being “Brothers Only” or “Sisters Only,” 
as well as enforce strict rules about communication between individuals of a different 
gender. 
 Online space undoubtedly creates new space for women to communicate. 
However, women do not have access to all of this space equally. While Muslim women 
forums, like Hawaa World, allow women to create specific communities relevant to their 
daily lives, many other sites have systems in place to exclude them. Many sites used 
administrative policies to restrict access to specific sites or regulate communication 
between women and men. Furthermore, language coding, such as referring to fellow 
commentators only as brothers signifies the community as male, where women are 
neither invited nor seen to be participating. Due to the anonymity afforded by online 
space, women almost certainly do participate in the forums. However, when they are 
perceived not to exist in these communities, the impact of their voices is limited. Thus, 
when thinking of a new public sphere opened by the Internet, it is important to 
understand that this new space still reflects many of the same limitations as physical 
space. Following Mouffe’s critique of Habermas, online space still possesses certain 
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discursive power assumptions and well as coercion that limits the voices of excluded 
groups. 
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Microblogging and al-Shabaab: 
 
Nowhere are the methodological problems of understanding online social media more 
apparent than with the micro-blogging platform, Twitter. Unlike blogs and forums, 
Twitter is not a closed community that can be policed. New accounts are regularly 
created, reported, and shut down, making an adequate sample size virtually impossible to 
collect. Furthermore, unless a biography explicitly provides a location, it is impossible to 
tell if a person is tweeting from Baghdad, London, or Omaha. At its best, Twitter can 
only be very rough qualitative research, where the causation and implication of trends 
must be tentatively gleaned. That being said, perhaps more so than any platform, Twitter 
relies on language coding in tweets and biographies to define an audience. 
Twitter fights between official government accounts have become media sensations 
of late. The online spat between the official Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the 
Palestinian al-Qassam Brigades’ accounts in 2012, for example, received widespread 
international news coverage. A similar phenomenon developed between media 
spokespeople for M23 rebels in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Armed 
Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) Twitter handle. However, 
significantly less attention has been paid to non-official accounts and their role in 
creating propaganda and disseminating threats. This kind of Twitter behavior has been 
especially prominent with al-Shabaab affiliated accounts in Somalia and the Somali 
diaspora worldwide. A loose, unorganized coalition of users regularly threatens 
prominent Kenyan officials, disseminates information about Somali martyrs, and 
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highlights (or creates) abuses by African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)—the 
official UN peacekeeping force—and the Kenyan Defense Forces.  
Differentiating between al-Shabaab affiliated accounts and those of sympathetic 
Somali diaspora is difficult. However, there are several general trends that can inform 
educated guesses. Through systematically looking at biographies of specific Twitter 
handles, I was able to find some general trends. Biographies that include “Somali and 
Proud,” “Somali Pride,” or (in Arabic) “Somalii wa iftkhir” are almost exclusively 
Somali diaspora, located primarily in London. This goes for those on 
“#TeamSOMALIA” as well. The diaspora accounts tend to be older and far more 
established, following more people and having more followers. I was also able to 
determine that they will also speak in educated English, with proper grammar and 
spelling. Almost all of the accounts use British spellings, reflecting the large Somali 
diaspora in the UK.  
The accounts thus identified as diaspora-based, as a general rule, are far less 
radical and tweet at official accounts such as @amisomsomalia (the official UN account) 
or @KDFinfo (the official Kenyan Defense Forces account). User @Ali_Waaye, for 
example, who describes himself as having a “Body in London, Mind in Somalia,” 
tweeted @KDFinfo on February 12th, 2014, “stop showing us propaganda…show us the 
war crimes you are committing.” And again on the same day, “#Kenya’s murder squad 
aka KDF are criminals and mass murderers.” User @KingYusufYusuff, who has a 
Gandhi quote in his biography, tweeted on February 10th, “#Somalia army invades 
Mogadishu homes…let us hope they will not end up abusing innocent people.” These 
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tweets are fairly representative of the diaspora’s focus on war crimes and as 
@KingYusufYusuff says, “the inept gov [and] AMISOM.” However, the diaspora does 
occasionally launch threats at official accounts, such as when the aforementioned @Ali-
Waaye tweeted @KDFinfo, “I am sure we will pay you filthy enemies of #Somalia back 
one day and kill a lot [of you].” These threats are exceptions to the norm of stressing 
good governance and minimizing war crimes. 
Despite the difficulty in locating the origins of the diaspora accounts, the 
differences between them and two other kinds of accounts that regularly interact with 
Kenyan officials are significant. These other types of accounts tend to be far more 
radical, issuing death threats, promising to murder Kenyan soldiers, and openly 
expressing a desire for martyrdom. These accounts are likely affiliated with either 
international jihadi organizations or local al-Shabaab affiliates. Determining the origins 
of these accounts is nothing more than educated guesswork, although there are some very 
prominent clues. 
Many of the Somali diaspora accounts appear to support al-Shabaab as a 
nationalistic obligation. The stress on good governance and human rights is markedly 
different that the other two types of accounts, which engage and reify wider Salafi-Jihadi 
discussions of kuffar, martyrdom, etc.. 
The first of these latter two types of accounts is fairly prominent in wider Jihadi 
religious communities. Like the diaspora, the accounts are very large and established; 
they tend to be over a year old with thousands of followers. They serve as a news 
aggregator for wider jihadi communities. Most of the tweets are in Arabic, providing up 
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to date news on recent attacks in Syria and Iraq, listing the martyrs and those who they 
killed. However, these accounts will occasionally engage with current events in Somalia, 
almost always in English. Their knowledge of Arabic is fairly unique among those who 
tweet at Kenyan officials and they are intimately connected to jihadi movements 
worldwide. An excellent example of this kind of account is @AbuSaidsud, who has 
2,810 followers and over 8,500 tweets. The account tweets only in English and perfect, 
grammatically correct Fusha. On February 1st, he/she tweeted “photo for martyr ISAA 
ABD ALLAH [a nome de guerre] may Allah have mercy on him 
#killingMuslimsinMombasa #Westgate #Somalia.” The tweet also included a picture of 
an anonymous man who had been shot to death. On October 6th, 2013 the account got in a 
debate with an anti-terrorism account likely based in Kenya,63 tweeting, “Insha’Allah my 
turn will come with car bomb myself and take many kafirs to hell[.] Crazy huh.” These 
tweets are fairly typical for non-diaspora accounts; however, as we will see, there are 
some important differences between the structure of the account and those we can guess 
are from Somalia. Importantly, while the account predominantly tweeted in Arabic, the 
tweets about Somalia were always in English. While it may be easy to write off such 
tweets as propaganda, few Somalis speak English and even fewer have Twitter. The 
question is what audience did the writer expect to read the threats? 
The third kind of account is structurally very different from the other two. The 
nature of these accounts points to them being located in Somalia. Unlike the other 
accounts, they tend to be highly transient. Often, they exist for only a week or so before 
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 The account positively engages with @MajorEChirchir, the official KDF spokesperson,  and 
@AMISOMSomalia 
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being deleted or taken down; they amass few followers and a majority of their tweets are 
threats directed at Kenyan officials. Furthermore, compared to the diaspora, their English 
tweets are full of spelling errors and they display a general lack of knowledge of English 
syntax. There are also occasional tweets in Somali and Arabic. However, the Arabic 
tweets are almost universally limited to the Qur’an and hadith. What is most interesting is 
that many of the Arabic tweets include short vowels, suggesting the text was simply copy 
and pasted from the Internet, rather than being typed out. No native speakers of Arabic 
use short vowels in microblogging platforms like Twitter. They take an extremely long 
time to type out and the process is tedious. Therefore, it is likely that any tweets that 
contain short vowels were copied from the Internet, where the practice is slightly more 
common. As al-Shabaab lacks a formal Twitter profile, these accounts operate as 
informal public relations. Unlike al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab’s formal media apparatuses were 
shut down quite comprehensively two years ago. There is no longer an official Twitter 
account or a Facebook page. As such, al-Shabaab relies on these informal networks of 
supporters to disseminate information. 
 Tracking these accounts is difficult because they are highly transient; therefore, 
gathering a representative sample is virtually impossible. Nevertheless, 
@suleimanwanyony provides a fairly good example. With only 41 followers and 72 
tweets, the account stopped tweeting January 28th 2014, after around a month and a half 
of activity. Without tweeting at anyone, on December 18th, 2013, he tweeted, “The latest 
recruits have the same military training as the Westgate attackers.” Two days before, he 
tweeted (again at no one in particular), “well done my brother 4 not letting kenya forgte 
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our role. ‘Grenade attack in Eastleigh&twin explosion in Wajir.’” Although, he would 
also occasionally tweet at people, such as the Standard, a major Kenyan newspaper, with, 
“there is No value for Kenyan money here fraud Kafirs” on  anuary 2nd, 2014. 
@mujahiidat is another example of this account. His bio is simply “If Dying is once in a 
lifetime, why not make it a martyrdom operation?” Typical of this type of account, he 
regularly interacted with Kenyan military officials, particularly @MajorEChirchir, the 
KDF military spokesman. After a standard tweet on December 29th, 2013 about praying 
for a safe return for soldiers, @mujahiidat responded, “rathr a retrn in cofins as thy went 
2somaia 2kill s th wl b killed #forgetsecurityinkenya as u r in somalia.” The broken 
English and bad syntax is a common theme; on the same day, “no safety for enemies of 
Allah who came to destroy the shriah.everywhere they stop on the earth explodes with 
them..#jihadmomments.” These accounts also retweet extensively; particularly anti-
Semitic and anti-American pictures. One picture that regularly makes rounds warns 
Muslims against visiting certain anti-Islam websites. However, with a large skull, the 
picture describes how, “ EWS have intentionally developed these websites to spread 
wrong information… so PLZ SEND this msg to as many muslims as possible. 
AlhamduLillah , These websites are blocked in Saudi Arabia.” 
 The most puzzling question is the role these accounts possibly fill. The tweets are 
almost exclusively in English and few Somalis have Twitter. To read the tweets as simple 
propaganda simply underscores that these accounts are unlikely to be read by local 
Somalis. Furthermore, the small follower count and the limited time these accounts 
actually exist and are active calls into question their reach and impact. Most likely, the 
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only people who read the tweets are the Kenyan officials who they target and the 
Kenyans and Western journalists who read the officials’ Tweets. Since Tweet responses 
are linked to the original tweet and can be viewed by everyone, the Tweets are viewed by 
Kenyans and journalists who follow these accounts for news on the situation in Somalia. 
 In many ways, these tweets closely mirror Bin Laden’s early fatawaa issued 
under the World Islamic Front for Combat Against the Jews and Crusaders.64 These 
fatawaa played no significant role in al-Qaeda’s operational capabilities. While they may 
have boosted morale among low level soldiers, the primary purpose of the documents 
was to instill fear among Americans and their allies.65 These documents were, most 
importantly, a form of verbal terror. The loosely organized al-Shabaab affiliated twitter 
accounts and their allies in the diaspora and international jihadi movements underwent 
the same transition to increasingly decentralized control experienced within wider media 
changes. Twitter, and similar platforms, removes control of the production and 
dissemination of political statements away from group leaders, placing it in the hands of 
rank-and-file members. Of course, this process has also mirrored the dissolution of the 
more rigid hierarchical structure of al-Qaeda that existed in the 1990’s, largely due to the 
effects of the War on Terror. Nevertheless, new media fragments the ability of leaders 
and organizers to effectively manage a message. The physical location of the accounts, 
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 For a description of the globalization of suicide attacks and transnational terrorism, with a focus on al-
Qaeda, see: 
Assaf Moghadam, The globalization of martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the diffusion of suicide 
attacks (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008) 
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 For a description of al-Qaeda’s operational structure and capabilities contemporary with the 9/11 attacks, 
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Yonah Alexander and Michael S. Swetnam, Usama bin Laden's al-Qaida: profile of a terrorist network  
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whether it be London or Mogadishu, is no longer relevant. An unorganized group of 
ideological affiliated individuals is able to fulfill the role of a press office through 
decentralized control of production and dissemination of information. 
 Most importantly, this loosely-associated group of individuals that spans the 
globe is able to maintain this level of ideological cohesion outside of closed blogs and 
forums. If there truly is a “widened public sphere,” it is on public microblogging 
platforms. As long as the privacy settings for the account are set to public, anyone in the 
world can read, retweet, and reply to anyone else in the world. This ideological cohesion 
is maintained by specific practices of language coding, such as the “Somali Pride” among 
the London diaspora, which create unity in open space. Furthermore, these ideological 
attacks are attempts to control public space, limiting access and partitioning the space 
into an ideological battleground. 
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The Partitioned Public Sphere: 
Considering the divisions present in online space, it is worth considering whether 
the theoretical paradigms of New Social Movement theory and Eickelman, Anderson, 
and Bunt’s postulating of a widened Public Sphere are still useful for understanding 
activism in cyberspace. The answer must be a resounding yes. New online social media 
has drastically changed the way individuals are able to produce and disseminate 
information. For the first time in history, the average individual possesses the ability to 
project his or her voice beyond geographical space, outside the confines of personal 
networks. In both a geographic and networked sense, the public sphere is indeed 
expanded. 
However, I would like to add some simple caveats. Firstly, this widening is not 
unidirectional. It not only gives a platform to historically marginalized voices like women 
and queer individuals, it also allows reactionary, anti-democratic individuals, also 
historically cut off from mainstream political activity, political space. Furthermore, the 
fact that the public sphere is wider does not mean that it is universally more open. While 
changes in communication technology have broken down conceptions of geographic 
space, cyberspace still reflects the power structures and ideological coercion that exist in 
physical space. Whether the space is gendered, political, or religious, cyberspace tends to 
reflect the same, traditional exclusionary boundaries that exist in physical space. 
Salafi Internet boards are a prime example of partitioned online space. Heavy-
handed administrative policing excludes dissenting voices. Furthermore, a space can be 
coded, by the language used, as belonging to a specific ideology. It is important to place 
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words like Jihad, kaffir, and martyr within a wider jihadist, intellectual context. 
Understanding jihad only in the context of medieval warfare jurisprudence does nothing 
to illuminate how jihad is used in particular militant Salafi groups today. Language 
practices within a closed community define a space as belonging to a particular group. 
Whether or not dissenting voices are participating in these communities, hiding 
behind an anonymous handle, these dissenting voices are not perceived to exist in the 
online space. Since the space is an ideologically closed community, dissenting voices 
continue to be marginalized. This marginalization is especially apparent when online 
space is highly gendered. Women are relegated to certain areas of a forum community or 
perceived not to exist at all when talking about “real” Islamic issues like fiqh. Online 
communities simply recreate exclusionary, misogynist discourses that limit the ability of 
women to enter public discussion. 
Even outside closed forum communities, commentators can couch their speech in 
a specific, marked ideology. The microblogging platform Twitter is perhaps the most 
politically open space on the Internet. However, al-Shabaab affiliates and their allies in 
the Somali diaspora and wider international Jihadist movements can still for a community 
based off of language norms. 
 Nothing said previously should be interpreted to contradict the research done by 
New Social Movement theorists or Public Sphere advocates like Anderson and 
Eickelman. Instead, following Mouffe, I argue we should maintain a healthy skepticism 
of the idea that any public space can be truly “open,” free from coercion and dominant 
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power relationships. This work is simply a call to research into how the Internet has also 
allowed the same problematic aspects of the physical Public Sphere to manifest online. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
Bibliography 
Secondary Literature: 
 
Alexander, Yonah, and Michael S. Swetnam. Usama bin Laden's al-Qaida: profile of a  
terrorist network. Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2001. 
 
Homegrown Islamic Extremism in 2013: The Perils of Online Recruitment & Self- 
Radicalization. New  York, NY: Anti-Defamation League, 2014. 
 
Babayan, Kathryn, and Afsaneh Najmabadi. Islamicate sexualities: translations across  
temporal geographies of desire. Cambridge, Mass: Center for Middle Eastern 
Studies of Harvard University, 2008. 
 
Bunt, Gary R..Virtually Islamic: computer-mediated communication and cyber Islamic  
environments. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2000. 
Castells, Manuel. The rise of the network society. Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishers,  
1996. 
 
Cooke, Miriam, and Bruce B. Lawrence. Muslim networks from Hajj to hip hop. Chapel  
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005. 
 
Dahlberg, Lincoln. "The Habermasian Public Sphere: Taking Difference Seriously?"  
Theory and Society 34, no. 2 (April 2005): 111-36. 
 
The Daily Mail (London). "Glossy 'Jihad Cosmo' combines beauty tips with suicide  
bombing advice." March 13, 2011. 
 
Eickelman, Dale F., and Jon W. Anderson. New Media in the Muslim World: The  
Emerging Public Sphere,  2nd ed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003 
 
Geertz, Clifford. Islam observed; religious development in Morocco and Indonesia.  
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968 
 
Habermas,   rgen. The Structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a  
category of bourgeois society. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1991. 
 
Habermas,   rgen. The theory of communicative action. Boston: Beacon Press, 1984. 
 
Habermas,   rgen, and Steven Seidman.                              d              
reader. Boston: Beacon Press, 1989.  
 
 
53 
 
Hafez, Kai. Mass media, politics, and society in the Middle East. Cresskill, N.J.:  
Hampton Press, 2001. 
 
Hirschkind, Charles. "Cassette Ethics: Public Piety and Popular Media in Egypt." In  
Religion, Media, and the Public Sphere, edited by Birgit Meyer and Annelies 
Moors, 29-51. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006. 
 
Honneth, Axel, and Hans Joas.                                   rgen Habermas's The  
theory of communicative action. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1991. 
 
Jones, Alan.                          . Cambridge, UK: Islamic Texts Society, 2005. 
 
Kamalipour, Yahya R., and Hamid Mowlana. Mass media in the Middle East: a  
comprehensive handbook. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1994. 
 
Meyer, Birgit, and Annelies Moors. Religion, media, and the public sphere.  
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006. 
 
Mittermaier, Amira. Dreams that matter: Egyptian landscapes of the imagination.  
 Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011.  
 
Moghadam, Assaf. The globalization of martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the  
diffusion of suicide attacks. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008. 
 
Mouffe, Chantal. Dimensions of radical democracy: pluralism, citizenship, community.  
London: Verso, 1992. 
 
Naficy, Hamid . "Cassettes." In The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World. ,  
edited by John L. Esposito. Oxford Islamic Studies Online, 
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236MIW/e0140  (accessed 01-
Apr-2014). 
 
Saqr, 'Atiyyah. Letter, "Fatwa on the Interpretation of Dreams," August 10, 2003. 
 
Sreberny‐Mohammadi, Annabelle. “The Power of Tradition: Communication and the  
Iranian Revolution.” Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1985. 
 
Tarrow, Sidney G.. The new transnational activism. New York: Cambridge University  
Press, 2005. 
 
Tehranian, Majid. Communication and Revolution in Iran: The Passing of a Paradigm.  
Iranian Studies 13.1–4 (1980). 
 
 
54 
 
Tsotsis, Alexia. "Mubarak Shut Down the Internet, and The Internet Paid Him in Kind."  
TechCrunch, February 11, 2011. 
 
Internet Sources: 
www.alkottob.com 
 
www.allahsword.net 
 
Corpus.quran.com  
www.forums.islamicawakening.com 
 
www.forum.hawaaworld.com 
 
www.kalamullah.com 
 
www.myislamicdream.com 
 
www.qtafsir.com 
 
www.qwled.com 
 
http://shakesville.tumblr.com/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
